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Keep Tinkering: The Optimist and the Death 
Penalty 
Susan D. Rozelle∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to capital punishment, it may make sense to 
be a little bit defeatist.  Like abortion, the death penalty is a 
topic about which you have to presume that you are never going 
to change anyone else’s mind.  Whether the other person views 
it as a necessary part of the justice system or as a moral outrage, 
odds of changing the other person’s mind through reasoned 
discourse are slim. 
The first question for death penalty opponents must always 
be whether it is better to fight from inside the system or from 
outside it.1  The fear is that the more fair the system is made, the 
more palatable it becomes, and correspondingly, the farther 
away the ultimate goal of abolition is pushed.2 
∗ Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Stetson University College 
of Law.  Thanks to Associate Dean for Faculty and Professor Brian Gallini for inviting me 
to join this symposium, and to my terrific research assistant, Juliann Welch, for her 
invaluable assistance.  Any errors are my own.
1. See Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries’ Bias and the
Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 775 n.37 (2006) [hereinafter The 
Principled Executioner]. 
2. As the author previously recognized in The Principled Executioner:
Whether an accomplishable improvement in fairness to capital defendants 
helps or hurts the long-term goal of abolition is debatable:  the more fair the 
system becomes, the more palatable capital punishment becomes as a 
concept, and therefore the less likely it is to be abolished.  However, even an 
incremental increase in fairness could save lives, and the goal of abolition 
seems very far away regardless of how fairly the system is administered. 
Fundamentally, though, abolition is embraced by “principles that would be 
controlling even if error never infected the criminal process.” 
Id. (quoting Justice John Paul Stevens, Remarks at the Thurgood Marshall Awards 
Dinner (Aug. 6, 2005), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-
06-05.html [https://perma.cc/F8FC-FLS4]).   
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The optimistic coalition-builder, on the other hand, replies 
that every improvement in fairness stands to save someone’s 
life.  More pragmatically, abolition is taking a very long time.  
Finally, the coalition-builder asks, whose minds would be 
changed?  A fairer system will not persuade most abolitionists to 
become death-penalty proponents.  These opponents of capital 
punishment, for the most part, do not care about the machinery 
of death and whether it is fair or unfair.  They are motivated by 
the fact that a capital punishment scheme means the State 
sanctions killing people.  A system that is more fair but 
continues to kill is unlikely to change their minds. 
Cynics may ask whether an increase in fairness stands a 
chance of changing any minds at all.  Disturbingly, polls show 
that proponents of capital punishment are willing to accept a 
certain amount of collateral damage.  As of October 2009, “for 
many Americans, agreement with the assertion that innocent 
people have been put to death does not preclude simultaneous 
endorsement of the death penalty.  A third of all Americans, 
34%, believe an innocent person has been executed and at the 
same time support the death penalty.”3  It appears, then, that 
thirty-four percent of those polled accept the price of executing 
innocent people in order to kill those other capital defendants 
who did really bad things. 
Despite the cynics, a “keep tinkering” approach seems to 
offer the most hope for coalition-building.  Presumably, most 
proponents of the death penalty are people of good faith who 
would prefer not to pay the price of innocent lives—or, even if 
not innocent, still not the worst of the worst for whom death is 
supposedly reserved.  Under a fairer system, proponents would 
get the benefit of a structure that is more defensible.  No doubt 
those who are conscientious proponents of capital punishment 
are troubled by the flaws in the system and would prefer a 
For more information on capital punishment, see Defense Resources, CORNELL DEATH 
PENALTY PROJECT, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/death-penalty-
project/resources.cfm [https://perma.cc/B5R3-JB6C]; DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org [https://perma.cc/LGB9-Y48P]. 
3. Frank Newport, In U.S., Two-Thirds Continue to Support Death Penalty, GALLUP
(Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/123638/in-u.s.-two-thirds-continue-support-
death-penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/8FUB-E3BL]. 
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scheme that would allow them to sleep better at night.  Death 
penalty opponents would get fewer executions (though it is true 
that this comes at the cost of working within the system).4  
Although continuing to bring light to these dark, nonfunctional 
areas of the system may fail to persuade people to stop 
executions completely, it might, at least, save a few more lives.  
And so we keep tinkering. 
You may have heard by now that Florida’s death penalty 
law was recently found unconstitutional again.  In Hurst v. 
Florida,5 the U.S. Supreme Court finally got around to what was 
clear back in 2002 when it decided Ring v. Arizona.6  The right 
to a jury trial includes the right to have the jury decide, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the facts that stand to increase a defendant’s 
possible punishment from life to death.7 
Florida’s system at the time Ring was decided (and right up 
through Hurst) relied on a jury to make a sentencing 
recommendation only.8  The ultimate decision in Florida was 
made by the judge, the exact procedure that the Court had found 
unconstitutional in the Arizona case.9  In other words, it took 
Florida fourteen years to acknowledge crystal clear precedent.10  
When it did, the Legislature put together a better death penalty 
law, in that it gave power to the jury to decide on life or death.11  
4. This presumes that a capital punishment system that is more fair would result in
fewer executions, rather than more:  killing fewer people who do not deserve it, rather than 
killing more people who do not deserve it.  Cf. RUSH, The Trees, on HEMISPHERES 
(Mercury Records 1978) (“And the trees are all kept equal, By hatchet, Axe, And 
saw . . . .”). 
5. 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016).
6. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
7. Id. at 609.
8. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)-(3) (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)-
(3) (West 2016) (effective Oct. 1, 2016), invalidated by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 
(2016); Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620. 
9. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620-21.
10. Id. at 619 (“The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact
necessary to impose a sentence of death.  A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”). 
11. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3)(a)(2) (West 2017) (effective Oct. 1, 2016),
invalidated by Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). 
352 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol.  70:349
The one piece it refused to give up was the majority rule.12  The 
old death penalty scheme permitted a death sentence with a bare 
majority of jurors voting for death (seven to five).13  After Hurst, 
the legislators were chastened, but not entirely reformed.  The 
new law permitted death with a vote of ten to two.14 
Florida legislators had plenty of notice that this would not 
suffice.  Some members of the  Florida Supreme Court had said 
years before that unanimity should be required.15  The Court 
even went so far as to include a section entitled “The Need for 
Legislative Action” on unanimity of jury recommendations in 
capital sentencing in a 2005 opinion.16  It makes sense.  Without 
a unanimity requirement, we simply do not see the kind of deep 
discussion of the evidence—that is, the hard grappling with 
aggravators and mitigators—that is warranted when someone’s 
life is on the line.17 
12. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(c)-(3)(a)(2) (West 2017) (effective Oct. 1, 2016,
stating that “[i]f at least 10 jurors determine that the defendant should be sentenced to 
death,” the court may impose either a death sentence or life imprisonment), invalidated by 
Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). 
13. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2016) (“Notwithstanding the
recommendation of a majority of the jury . . . .”), invalidated by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 
616 (2016). 
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(c) (West 2017) (effective Oct. 1, 2016, stating
that “[i]f at least 10 jurors determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the 
jury’s recommendation to the court shall be a sentence of death.  If fewer than 10 jurors 
determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s recommendation to 
the court shall be a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.”), 
invalidated by Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). 
15. See, e.g., Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 710 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, C.J.,
concurring); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143, 153 (Fla. 2002) (Pariente, J., concurring).  But 
see Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 446 (Fla. 2014) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that 
Ring required a “unanimous jury recommendation as to sentence”), reversed, 136 S. Ct. 
616, remanded to 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).   
16. State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 548-50 (Fla. 2005), abrogated by Hurst v.
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
17. Steele, 921 So. 2d at 549.
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It is unclear why the Legislature persisted in ignoring the 
writing on the wall, but the ten to two version was enacted in 
2016.18  It was struck down by the Florida Supreme Court seven 
months later.19  Among other things, the Hurst opinion held that 
jurors must be unanimous in recommending death,20 unanimous 
about why (which aggravating factors they found),21 and 
unanimous that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators in the 
case.22 
[W]e perceive a special need for jury unanimity in capital sentencing.  Under 
ordinary circumstances, the requirement of unanimity induces a jury to 
deliberate thoroughly and helps to assure the reliability of the ultimate 
verdict.  The “heightened reliability demanded by the Eighth Amendment in 
the determination whether the death penalty is appropriate”; Sumner v. 
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 107 S.Ct. 2716, 2720, 97 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987); 
convinces us that jury unanimity is an especially important safeguard at a 
capital sentencing hearing.  In its death penalty decisions since the mid-
1970s, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of 
ensuring reliable and informed judgments.  These cases stand for the general 
proposition that the “reliability” of death sentences depends on adhering to 
guided procedures that promote a reasoned judgment by the trier of fact.  The 
requirement of a unanimous verdict can only assist the capital sentencing 
jury in reaching such a reasoned decision.   
Id. (quoting State v. Daniels, 542 A.2d 306, 315 (Conn. 1988)). 
18. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(c) (West 2016) (effective Mar. 7, 2016), amended
by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(c) (West 2017) (effective Oct. 1, 2016), invalidated by 
Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).  See also Alan Blinder, Death Sentences Require 
Unanimous Jury, Florida Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/us/florida-death-penalty.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/UMY9-JYNF] (discussing the recent overhaul of Florida’s capital 
punishment legislation). 
19. Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 58-60, cert. denied.
20. Id. at 44 (“[I]n order for the trial court to impose a sentence of death, the jury’s
recommended sentence of death must be unanimous.”). 
21. Id.  The court found “the requirement of jury unanimity as to the elements of a
criminal offense” to mean the ultimate recommendation of the unanimous jury is death.  Id. 
“In capital cases in Florida, these specific findings required to be made by the jury include 
the existence of each aggravating factor that has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the finding that the aggravating factors are sufficient, and the finding that the aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances.”  Id. 
22. Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 44.
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As a result, Florida was once again without a death 
penalty.23  Although this appeared to follow the trend of 
shrinking support for capital punishment across the country over 
the last forty years,24 this state of affairs, in Florida at least, did 
not last.  Given the level of support for a death-sentence option 
in the Sunshine State,25 the Legislature predictably passed 
another version of a capital-punishment statute when it 
reconvened in March 2017.26  Even so, bit by bit, the law of 
capital punishment is getting narrower, applying to fewer and 
fewer people.27  Bit by bit, the tinkerers are winning. 
The trend is visible in many other places as well.  One 
telling example is from a completely different part of the 
country than Florida.  Lefty-liberal Massachusetts has not had a 
death penalty since the 1940s.28  But when former Republican 
presidential hopeful Mitt Romney ran for governor, he pledged 
23. It is unclear whether this will stop death sentences.  The Florida Supreme Court
heard oral arguments on Tuesday, February 2, 2016, regarding whether to proceed with the 
execution of Cary Michael Lambrix and Richard Knight, ultimately granting stays pending 
further clarification of the law.  Order Granting Stay of Execution, Lambrix v. Florida, No. 
SC16-8 (Fla. 2016).  See Dara Kam, Florida Supreme Court Justices Halt Execution Amid 
‘Consternation’, LEDGER (Feb. 2, 2016, 8:16 PM), 
http://www.theledger.com/article/LK/20160202/News/608076624/LL/ 
[https://perma.cc/V4ZA-KD3M] (discussing stay of executions of Cary Michael Lambrid 
and Richard Knight). 
24. As of October 2016:
Support for the death penalty in the United States is at its lowest level since 
November 1972, according to a Gallup poll released October 25.  Gallup 
reported that 60% of respondents said they support capital punishment—off 
one percentage point from last year—while opposition remained at 37%, 
matching its highest level since the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the 
death penalty in 1972. 
Gallup Poll: Support for Death Penalty at Lowest Level Since 1972, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6589 [https://perma.cc/ST8M-HC8L]. 
25. “A Sun-Sentinel poll found that only 45% of Floridians support the death penalty
when offered the sentencing option of life in prison without parole, down from 60% last 
November.  In addition, support for life in prison without parole has risen from 16% last 
year to 28% this year.”  State Polls and Studies, Florida, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-polls-and-studies?scid=23&did=210#Florida 
[https://perma.cc/5VVH-6ZQ2]. 
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2017) (effective Mar. 13, 2017); Blinder,
supra note 18. 
27. See infra Part III.
28. Massachusetts ceased executing prisoners in 1947.  Scott Helman, Death Penalty
Bill Fails in House: Romney Initiative Roundly Defeated, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2005, 
at B1. 
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to his conservative base that he would bring it back.29  In support 
of my premise that our best chance for progress comes from 
joining together to ameliorate what procedural pieces we can, 
Romney proved himself a tinkerer.  He pledged, even when 
appealing to his conservative, Republican brethren, that he 
would bring capital punishment back in “failsafe” form.30 
Once elected, Romney did indeed appoint a blue-ribbon 
Governor’s Council on Capital Punishment, which produced a 
report in 2004.31  Too modest to call its recommendations 
“failsafe,” the Council proclaimed them only “as infallible as 
humanly possible.”32 
Modesty aside, it was a good report.  In fact, New York 
Times Magazine called it one of the most noteworthy ideas of 
the year.33  The proposed recommendations addressed many of 
the same issues that most capital punishment critics raise to this 
day: 
(1) Execute only the “worst of the worst”; 
(2) Pay for good defense lawyers; 
(3) Warn juries about problems with confessions, 
eyewitness identifications, and other known limitations of 
the kinds of evidence presented; 
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN ET AL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, reprinted in 80 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2005) (reporting findings of 
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney’s Council on Capital Punishment); see also Emily 
Bazelon, Foolproof Death Penalty, The, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 12, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/12/magazine/foolproof-death-penalty-the.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z3CC-U33J].  
32. HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 31.
33. Bazelon, supra note 31.  Author Emily Bazelon summarizes the Report’s
provisions: 
[E]xecute only the “worst of the worst” . . . . Pay for top-notch defense 
lawyers.  Caution juries about the questionable value of confessions, 
eyewitness identifications and testimony by jailhouse snitches.  Require 
scientific evidence to corroborate guilt, with DNA matches as the 
benchmark.  Set up an independent panel to watch out for crime-lab errors.  
Create a death-penalty-review commission.  And base death sentences on a 
“no doubt” standard of proof. 
Id.  Arguing that with such copious protections, the statute must be “solely symbolic,” 
Professor Franklin Zimring opined, “We have entered the postmodern era of death-penalty 
discourse.”  Id. 
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(4) Require cutting edge scientific evidence of guilt (e.g., 
DNA match); and 
(5) Change the standard of proof in death cases to “no 
doubt.”34 
Among the concerns that critics raise, the problem of 
residual doubt stands out for its hubris.  In social science 
research, one of the factors that jurors consistently cite as most 
important to them is the presence of residual doubt.35  The 
reasoning is stunning, but jurors report that when they were not 
sure they had the right person, they imposed life in prison rather 
than death.36 
Hubris aside, even this “infallible as humanly possible” 
version of a death penalty scheme was not enough to convince 
Massachusetts to reinstitute capital punishment.37  Presumably, 
Romney knew the effort would fail (and it did: the vote in 
Massachusetts ended up being two to one against).38  The day 
before the vote, Romney downplayed what he surely expected 
was its upcoming failure when he stated that the death penalty 
was important, but not at the “highest level”:  not as important 
as healthcare, education, job creation, & (wait for it) auto 
insurance reform.39 
34. Id.
35. See Patrick Mulvaney & Katherine Chamblee, Innocence and Override, 126
YALE L.J. 118, 122 (2016). 
36. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1563 (1998) (“[T]he best thing [a capital 
defendant] can do [to improve his chances of receiving a life sentence] . . . is to raise doubt 
about his guilt.”). 
37. See Helman, supra note 28, at B1.
38. Legislators voted against the bill by an almost two-to-one margin (defeated 100
to 53).  Id.  Representatives were quoted as voting against the bill because capital 
punishment necessarily carries the risk of mistakenly putting an innocent person to death. 
See id.  “[T]here never can be certainty. . . .”  Id. (quoting Rep. Eugene L. O’Flaherty). 
“Nothing in life is foolproof.”  Id. (quoting Rep. Daniel E. Bosley). 
39. Helman, supra note 28, at B1.  Perhaps trying to minimize a foreseeably negative
outcome for his initiative, the day before the vote it was said of Governor Romney that: 
[A]lthough he still believes that reinstating the death penalty is important, he 
does not consider it as critical as making strides in healthcare, education, job 
creation, and auto insurance reform.  “The death penalty is not at the highest 
level,” he told reporters after testifying on auto insurance before a legislative 
committee. 
Id. 
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The readers of this article probably think the death penalty 
is as important as saving money on auto insurance, so I propose 
one modest way in which capital punishment in this country 
could be made more fair.  Ideally, this will be an idea that both 
abolitionists and proponents of capital punishment can get 
behind.  My suggestion is simply that we begin to use the law of 
death qualification that we already have. 
II. WHAT IS DEATH QUALIFICATION?
Prospective jurors in capital cases are questioned about 
their views on the death penalty in a process called “death 
qualification.”40  The idea is to excuse for cause any individuals 
who “are so opposed to capital punishment that they either (1) 
would not find [guilt] regardless of the evidence, or (2) would 
not consider death as a possible sentence regardless of the 
[evidence].”41  Those who would not find guilt are called 
“nullifiers,” and those who would not consider death as a 
possible sentence are called “excludables.”42 
Few would argue that nullifiers should serve on a jury.43  If 
asked, “Did this person violate the law?” jurors are sworn to 
answer truthfully.  Nullification is a real jury power, of course, 
and an important check on the system.44  However, jurors who 
40. See Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death
Qualification, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 677 (2002) [hereinafter The Utility of Witt]. 
41. Id.; see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 290 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (referring to “the problem posed by the not infrequent refusal of juries to convict 
murderers rather than subject them to automatic death sentences.”); Rick Seltzer et al., The 
Effect of Death Qualification on the Propensity of Jurors to Convict: The Maryland 
Example, 29 HOW. L.J. 571, 572-74 (1986).  
42. See The Principled Executioner, supra note 1, at 776.
43. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 172 (1986) (“‘[N]ullifiers’ may
properly be excluded from the guilt-phase jury . . . .”); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 
510, 520 (1968) (excluding those who “would not even consider” death penalty would 
have been permissible). 
44. HANS ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARDS CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 3 (1968) (citing LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL 
LAW 154 (1948)).  
Professor Hans Zeisel encapsulates the “long and distinguished history” of 
jury nullification by recounting:  “When English law still had the death 
penalty for such crimes as stealing 40 shillings or more from a dwelling 
house, the jury would often convict of stealing 39 shillings even if what was 
stolen was a five pound note.” 
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use that power are expressly refusing to follow the law.45  Of 
course, that is the point of nullification, and its link with capital 
punishment is a long and honorable one.46  In fact, nullification 
is credited with being the reason that we have the set of 
homicide laws (among other things) that we have today.47  
Generally speaking, there is universal agreement that if 
prospective jurors say they will not apply the law, they should 
be excused.48  The fight is over the excludables—those 
prospective jurors who will find guilt if it is warranted, but will 
not consider death under any circumstances.49 
III. THE BIG IDEA
In practice, many more prospective jurors are excluded 
under existing law than should be.50  Jurors are death qualified 
when asked, in essence, whether their views about the death 
penalty would “substantially impair” their ability to follow 
The Principled Executioner, supra note 1, at 776. 
45. Id. at 776-77.
46. See id. at 776 (citation omitted).
47. See Andrew J. Parmenter, Nullifying the Jury: “The Judicial Oligarchy”
Declares War on Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 386 (2007). 
48. See, e.g., LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT LAW 57 (2004). 
49. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).  See generally Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167 (1986) (arguing that the resulting prosecutorial basis created by 
death-qualification violates the constitutional rights of the defendant under the Sixth 
Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement and the requirement of impartiality in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  Some scholars and advocates have argued 
that we should end the practice of death qualification completely, because it violates the 
defendants’ right to be tried by a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. 
See, e.g., id. at 173-77 (summarizing and declining to adopt respondent’s argument); 
Stephen Gillers, Proving the Prejudice of Death-Qualified Juries after Adams v. Texas, 47 
U. PITT. L. REV. 219, 239, 252-53 (1985); J. Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic Dilemma 
in Death Qualification of Capital Jurors, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1107, 1168-69 (2014); 
Welsh S. White, Death-Qualified Juries: The “Prosecution-Proneness” Argument 
Reexamined, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 353, 406 (1980).  So far, anyway, these people have all 
lost, and with the election of Donald Trump and his Supreme Court appointee(s), it seems 
unlikely that the country will revisit those arguments anytime soon. 
50. See The Utility of Witt, supra note 40, at 691-93.
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instructions and obey their oaths, either in finding guilt or in 
considering death as a possible punishment.51 
Leaving aside nullifiers, the duty at issue is the juror’s duty 
to consider and weigh the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances presented in the case.52  Unlike the factual 
question answered in bad faith by nullifiers (did this defendant 
commit the crime?), the question at issue for excludables is a 
normative one (should this defendant live or die?).  Nullifiers 
violate their oaths because they swear to find facts truthfully, 
and fail to do that.53  Although the honest answer to the question 
“Did the government establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
this defendant committed this crime?” is “Yes,” the nullifier 
replies, “No.”  Excludables, on the other hand, do not violate 
their oaths.  They cannot.  Because the question “Should this 
defendant live or die?” is a normative one, there is no dishonest 
answer. 
Mandatory or automatic death sentences are 
unconstitutional.54  No mitigator is off-limits, and mercy is 
always an option.55  As a result, it is impossible to lie when 
answering the normative question, at least in the direction of 
life.  Jurors may decide, for example, that this defendant should 
die (because of x), but they will vote that he should live 
(because of y), or they might conclude the opposite.  As long as 
the aggravators they consider are on the list of permissible 
statutory considerations, there is no wrong answer to the 
51. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38, 45 (1980)) (finding jurors may be excused for cause whenever their “views ‘would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as [] juror[s] in accordance 
with [their] instructions and [their] oath.’”). 
52. The Utility of Witt, supra note 40, at 682–83.  “In all thirty-nine jurisdictions
currently permitting a death penalty, the sentencer is to ‘consider’ or ‘weigh’ the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case, or other language to that same 
effect.”  Id.  
53. Id. at 684.
54. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1975) (plurality opinion)
(finding that mandatory death sentences are unconstitutional for violating the Eighth 
Amendment). 
55. See Stephen Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional Accuracy at the
Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1037, 1083, 1088-90 (1985) 
(discussing the discretion the sentencer has when imposing the death penalty). 
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normative question.56  All mitigators are permissible,57 and death 
is never mandatory.58  By definition, then, whatever the jury 
ultimately decides is the right answer to the “should this 
defendant live or die?” question is an honest answer. 
Unfortunately, this is not how it works in the real world.  In 
reality, some prospective jurors in voir dire will say things such 
as, “I’m opposed to capital punishment.  I would never vote for 
the death penalty.”  The judge then presses those jurors more or 
less closely on whether they really mean it, and barring the 
jurors’ convincing the judge that, on second thought, they really 
could, those jurors are excused for cause.59 
Legally, though, this is wrong.  In fact, almost all of those 
prospective jurors are competent.  The argument goes like this: 
1) There is no such thing as a mandatory death sentence.60
2) That means that no particular sentencing outcome is
ever required.61 
3) Therefore, under no circumstance must a juror vote for
death.62 
In other words, it is entirely consistent with existing law, 
assuming jurors diligently follow their instructions and their 
oaths, for any given jurors never to vote for death.63 
56. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197, 203 (1976) (upholding a statutory scheme
which provided:  “The jury is not required to find any mitigating circumstance in order to 
make a recommendation of mercy . . . but it must find a statutory aggravating circumstance 
before recommending a sentence of death.”). 
58. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-05.
59. Then-professor and now Dean Andrea Lyon doubts the accuracy of this process,
stating: 
It’s been my experience that people who oppose the death penalty tend to be 
pretty honest about it, but people who support it tend to lie and will say upon 
rehabilitation, “oh, sure, I’ll consider mitigation if the judge tells me to.” . . . 
Jury selection is . . . a process of elimination that is carried out in an 
intimidating courtroom environment, with a seal, and a person in a robe, and 
a bailiff who is ordering people around while armed.  It’s set up to scare you 
to death.  As a result, jurors look for the “correct” answer to the question—
the civics answer.  
Andrea D. Lyon, The Negative Effects of Capital Jury Selection, 80 IND. L.J. 52, 53 (2005). 
60. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-05.
61. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976).
62. See People v. Bernette, 197 N.E.2d 436, 443 (Ill. 1964).
63. See Wainwight v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 443-45 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The law requires jurors do two things.  First, they must 
consider and then weigh the evidence for and against each 
possible sentence.64  To consider means to think about.65  The 
fact that some jurors may have thought about a death sentence in 
the abstract, or in the context of another case, is legally 
irrelevant.66  What is required is that jurors think about it again, 
this time with regard to the specific facts of the case before 
them.67  In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court 
expressly held that opposition to capital punishment in principle 
is not disqualifying.68  What is disqualifying is the unwillingness 
to think about it in the context of the facts of this case.69 
This is the basis for my contention that almost all people 
who are excused for cause due to their opposition to capital 
punishment are, in fact, qualified to sit and ought not be 
excused.  Although small children might put their fingers in 
their ears and call out, “I can’t hear you!” most prospective 
jurors would contain themselves and listen.  Especially in the 
context of a capital jury trial, it seems reasonable to presume 
that almost all fellow human beings will take their duty 
seriously.  Frankly, if we cannot trust capital jurors to take 
seriously their duty to consider the evidence before them, then 
we have bigger problems. 
The second thing required of jurors is that they weigh the 
evidence.70  In other words, they are obligated to decide how 
much each mitigator and each aggravator counts, and, in the 
64. See The Utility of Witt, supra note 40, at 687-89.
65. Id.; see also LAURENCE URDANG, THE OXFORD THESAURUS 75 (Am. ed. 1992);
Consider, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (“To fix the mind on, with a view to 
careful examination; to examine; to inspect.”). 
66. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968).  See United States v. Flores,
63 F.3d 1342, 1356 (5th Cir. 1995) (“In [the juror’s] case, the source of his bias was not the 
death penalty in the abstract, or in some irrelevant hypothetical case[,]” which would not 
have been instructive or legally significant as to his attitude towards imposition of capital 
punishment). 
67. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519.
68. Id. at 520.
69. Id. at 519-22.
70. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862. 914-15 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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end, which outcome is called for.71  As a close relative of the 
“should this defendant live or die?” question, there is no right 
answer to this question, either.  Jurors are not given a scale to 
weigh aggravators against mitigators.72  There is no law 
governing their discretion as to the comparative weight accorded 
each aggravator versus each mitigator.73  We cannot test a drop 
of blood and find an answer to the question of whether the jury 
correctly found that this defendant deserves to live or die.  If 
there were such a test, we would not need jury trials.74  That is, 
of course, the point of a jury constituted from a cross-section of 
the community—to provide a gut-check of the community’s 
norms and values.75  It is perfectly permissible (and common) 
for jurors to decide that a circumstance presented by the defense 
as a mitigator does not qualify as such, or vice versa.76  The fact 
that a defendant held a steady job, for example, offered to prove 
that he had some good qualities and some potential worth 
saving, can be viewed by some jurors as proof of his culpability, 
in that it shows he had the ability to behave better.77  Likewise, 
evidence offered by the prosecution as proof that he made the 
conscious choice to commit a crime may be taken by some 
jurors as proof of his potential to do right.78  And in either case, 
some jurors could conclude that fact does not matter at all, or 
71. In fact, the statutes in Alabama and Wyoming explicitly state that the mere
numerical comparison has no significance.  See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-48 (West 2016); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(d)(i)(C) (West 2016). 
72. The Utility of Witt, supra note 40, at 684.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 688-89.
[A]s long as prospective jurors will carefully examine and ponder over the 
evidence, they will follow the instruction to “consider” it.  They need not 
conclude that any probative force should be given to this or that piece of 
evidence.  Constitutionally, they cannot be required to conclude any such 
thing.  They can be and are required to engage in the process, to give the 
evidence its due consideration. 
Id. at 688. 
75. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-77 (1986).
76. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442-43 (1990).
77. The Utility of Witt, supra note 40, at 690.
78. See id.
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that it matters more than anything else.79  Their job is to weigh 
the evidence. 
As before, the law does not—and cannot80—dictate which 
outcome prospective jurors will reach with respect to how to 
weigh the evidence in the case.  What matters is the process by 
which they get there.81  In the same way, it is not what they will 
ultimately decide as to life or death.82  We cannot require that.83  
What we can, and do, require is a system that regulates how they 
arrive at their decision.84  Will they consider and weigh the 
evidence?  The answer for almost everyone is surely “yes.” 
IV. WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?
The fact that almost everyone is qualified to serve on a 
capital jury (because almost everyone will listen carefully to the 
evidence and think about how much weight to give each fact 
that argues for life versus death) matters because wrongly 
excusing excludables has two important side effects.  First, it 
removes those potential jurors who are more defense-friendly in 
general from juries.  Second, the process of death qualification 
convinces those who undergo it that defendants are guilty, and 
the only task left is to find jurors who can vote for death.85  It is 
a simple deduction.  Those prospective jurors who say they 
would never vote for death get excused.  Ergo, the judge must be 
looking for jurors who will. 
There is a lot of social science research on these points.  
These investigations include, for example, the Capital Jury 
Project—which interviewed 1,200 actual capital jurors in 350 
cases86—and Craig Haney’s famous studies.87  The research 
79. See id.
80. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 301.
82. Id. at 302, 305.
83. Id. at 303.
84. Id. at 303-04.
85. Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the
Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., 121, 128-30 (1984). 
86. William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law’s
Failure to Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51, 51 (2003). 
87. Haney, supra note 85.
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shows that death qualification removes those who are more 
defense-friendly from juries.88  Blacks, women, and democrats, 
for example, are disproportionately stricken in death 
qualification.89 
The Capital Jury Project’s race-related data are especially 
striking.  In cases with a black defendant and a white victim, the 
racial composition of the jury powerfully predicts who gets 
death.90  Researchers coined terms for the “white male 
dominance effect,” describing the fact that when there are four 
or fewer white males on a jury, there is an approximately thirty 
percent chance of a death sentence.91  Five or more white males 
on a jury, however, raises the odds of death to about seventy 
percent.92  The other side of this coin is the “black male presence 
effect,” describing the fact that a jury containing no black men 
jurors will return a death sentence about seventy percent of the 
time.93  The presence of a single black man on the jury brings 
the odds down to about forty percent.94 
Among other reasons, researchers have confirmed that 
jurors’ interpretations of the same evidence vary widely based 
on race.95  This, too, makes sense.  We all see things through the 
lens of our own experiences.96  My favorite example has nothing 
to do with race, but illustrates the principle nicely.  Evidence 
that a man held an empty beer bottle over his head while 
hollering “bitch!” at his wife is ambiguous by itself.  Is the 
88. Id. at 130.
89. Welsh S. White, The Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-
Qualified Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1176, 1187 (1973) (surveying post-Witherspoon 
studies confirming prosecution-proneness of death-qualified juries); Neil Vidmar & Phoebe 
Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1245, 1253-54 (1974). 
90. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 86, at 77.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 86, at 77–80.  See also The Principled Executioner,
supra note 1, at 781 (describing the potential risks of a homogenous jury). 
96. “There are no facts, only interpretations.”  Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlass,
http://www.theperspectivesofnietzsche.com/nietzsche/ntruth.html [https://perma.cc/2VT7-
2QUB].  “Why does man not see things?  He is himself standing in the way: he conceals 
things.”  Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, 
http://www.theperspectivesofnietzsche.com/nietzsche/ntruth.html [https://perma.cc/8R3F-
Y89P]. 
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bottle a weapon raised in an imminent attack, or just a request 
(less than charming, certainly, but not physically threatening) for 
another beer?97  Jurors’ experiences and backgrounds will make 
one of these explanations more intuitive that the other.  If 
different experiences and backgrounds are not represented on 
the jury, then the less-intuitive (for those jurors who did sit) 
explanation might never be considered simply because it never 
occurred to anyone on that jury—even if it happens to be the 
right one. 
Removing the excludables skews the jury in other ways, 
too.  There are a startling number of automatic death penalty 
voters, for example.  It is as unconstitutional to vote for death as 
it is to vote for life without considering and weighing the facts 
of the particular case,98 but the number of actual capital jurors 
who said to researchers that the “only acceptable sentence” was 
death ranged from twenty-four to seventy percent, depending on 
the circumstances.99  In contrast, those actual capital jurors who 
said the “only acceptable sentence” was life ranged from two to 
seven percent.100  On a twelve-person jury, then, the typical 
defendant can expect to have between two to eight automatic 
death votes, and less than one automatic life vote.101 
Jurors’ knowledge of the law is a problem, as well.  When 
asked to give examples of when they would not vote for death, 
actual capital jurors offered the following instances:  war time, 
children playing with a gun, a hunting accident, and (my 
favorite) if the guy was not guilty.102  This would be funny but 
for the fact that real people are being sentenced to death by 
97. Cf. State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 476, 479 (Kan. 1985) (involving similar facts
relevant to self-defense claim in context of battered-spouse syndrome). 
98. “Any juror to whom mitigating factors are . . . irrelevant should be disqualified
for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without 
basis in the evidence developed at trial.” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739 (1992). 
99. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 86, at 62.
100.  Id. 
101.  See The Principled Executioner, supra note 1, at 789. 
102.  Marla Sandys & Scott McClelland, Stacking the Deck for Guilt and Death: The 
Failure of Death Qualification to Ensure Impartiality, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE 
ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 385, 400 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
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jurors who think the only time it is appropriate to impose a life 
sentence is when the accused’s behavior is not a crime at all. 
Additional concerning results of jurors’ votes being skewed 
towards death include the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
jurors settled on punishment before hearing a single piece of 
evidence in sentencing, saying they were “absolutely convinced” 
or “pretty sure” about how they would vote.103  Fewer than five 
percent chose “not too sure.”104  This is yet another effect of 
death qualification.  By asking prospective jurors before they 
hear any evidence on sentencing about their feelings regarding 
the death penalty, and by excusing any who say they never 
would vote for death before the guilt phase even begins, the 
system primes jurors to consider the defendant guilty and 
deserving of death before trial even begins.105 
There is a lot more to say on this topic, but the bottom line, 
for the moment, is that if we were simply to start enforcing the 
law as it already exists, we would see more fairness in the 
administration of the death penalty.106  We would see more fairly 
balanced juries in terms of viewpoint and life experiences, 
which would produce more accurate verdicts both in terms of 
guilt and in applying the community norms for valuing 
aggravators and mitigators.  We would also see fewer premature 
decisions, with jurors able to hear the evidence on guilt and  
punishment without being primed from the beginning to believe 
that the defendant is guilty and deserves death.107 
These two suggestions are something that supporters of 
capital punishment should be able to get behind, simply because 
they increase fairness in the process.  It seems unlikely that 
people of good faith would want to keep using a system in 
which the racial composition of the jury is so predictive of 
outcomes, or one in which the typical jury contains no fewer 
than two and perhaps as many as eight automatic votes for 
103.  The Principled Executioner, supra note 1, at 790. 
104.  Id.  
105.  See The Utility of Witt, supra note 40, at 693-95; The Principled Executioner 
supra note 1, at 795-96. 
106.   The Utility of Witt, supra note 40, at 699. 
107.   Id. 
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death, when automatic voting—voting without considering and 
weighing the evidence—is always impermissible.  And death 
penalty opponents should like the fact that with these two 
changes, fewer people will be killed. 
Hope springs eternal. 
